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Incomes and Jobs in Global 
Production of Manufactures
New Measures of Competitiveness Based 




Gaaitzen J. de Vries
University of Groningen
OVERVIEW
It is frequently argued that globalization has entered a second phase. 
In the early twentieth century, rapidly falling transport costs ended the 
need for colocation of production and consumption. Competitiveness 
of countries in the fi rst phase was determined by domestic clusters of 
fi rms, mainly competing sector to sector. More recently, fostered by 
rapidly falling communication and coordination costs, the production 
process itself was unbundled, as the various stages of production need 
not be performed near each other anymore. In this new phase, inter-
national competition increasingly plays itself out at the level of tasks 
within fi rms, rather than at the level of products. And trade in goods 
is increasingly replaced by trade in tasks (Baldwin 2006). This creates 
new challenges for the way in which the competitiveness of nations is 
analyzed. 
Traditional measures indicate that China and other emerging coun-
tries have rapidly improved in competitiveness since the late 1990s, 
both in quantity and in quality, as attested to by booming exports of 
technologically sophisticated products. But recent product case studies 
suggest that European, Japanese, and U.S. fi rms still capture major parts 
of these value chains, as they specialize in high-value-added activities 
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such as software, design, branding, and system integration. China and 
other emerging countries are mainly involved in the assembling, test-
ing, and packaging activities, which are poorly compensated. A typical 
fi nding is that China keeps less than 4 percent of a product’s export 
value as income for its labor and capital employed in the production 
process of electronic goods (Ali-Yrkkö et al. 2011; Dedrick, Kraemer, 
and Linden 2010). To refl ect this new reality, a new measure of com-
petitiveness is needed that is based on the value added in production by 
a country, rather than the gross output value of its exports. Or, as put 
by Grossman and Rossi-Hansberg (2006, pp. 66–67), “Such measures 
are inadequate to the task of measuring the extent of a country’s inter-
national integration in a world with global supply chains. . . . We would 
like to know the sources of the value-added embodied in goods and the 
uses to which the goods are eventually put.”
Recently, Timmer et al. (2013) introduced a new concept that allows 
one to analyze the value that is added in various stages of regionally 
dispersed production processes. It is defi ned as the income generated in 
a country by participating in global manufacturing production, abbrevi-
ated by the term “GVC income” (for global value chain income). Com-
pared to traditional competitiveness indicators such as a country’s share 
in world exports, this new metric has three advantages. First, it indi-
cates to what extent a country can compete with other nations in terms 
of activities related to global manufacturing, rather than by compet-
ing in manufacturing products as measured by exports. These activities 
take place in manufacturing industries but also in services industries. 
Second, it is a refl ection of an economy’s strength to compete in both 
domestic and global markets. Third, income and employment effects of 
trade in tasks for separate groups of workers (such as low- and high-
skilled) can also be determined in the same unifi ed framework, refer-
ring to the concept of “GVC jobs.”1 
The main aim of this chapter is to establish a series of stylized facts 
on GVC incomes and jobs that can serve as a starting point for deeper 
analysis of the causes of global manufacturing production. Whereas 
Timmer et al. (2013) focused their analysis on trends in European com-
petitiveness, this chapter takes a more global view and provides analy-
ses for 20 major countries in the world, including the United States, 
Japan, major economies in Europe, Brazil, China, India, and Russia.
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In the remainder of this chapter, we fi rst outline our methodology 
for slicing up global value chains (in the next section, Section Two—
“GVC Incomes and Jobs: Methodology”) and introduce the concepts 
of GVC income and GVC jobs. We identify GVCs by tracing the fl ow 
of goods and services across industries and countries as described in a 
world input-output table. Using a decomposition technique that is built 
upon the original insights by Leontief (1949), we slice up the value of 
manufacturing expenditure into incomes for labor and capital in vari-
ous countries. These are the incomes of factors that are directly and 
indirectly needed for the production of the fi nal manufacturing goods. 
The empirical analysis is based on a new database, called the World 
Input-Output Database (WIOD), which combines national input-output 
tables, bilateral international trade statistics, and data on production fac-
tor requirements. A crucial characteristic of this database is the explicit 
measurement of national and international trade in intermediates. In 
Section Three, “The World Input-Output Database (WIOD),” we dis-
cuss the major features of this database. 
Section Four, “Trends in Manufactures’ GVC Incomes,” provides 
trends in GVC income shares across regions and major countries in 
the world. The analysis is based on demand for fi nal manufacturing 
products, and we show the dependency of countries on domestic and 
foreign sources of demand. We also show that only about half of the 
GVC income originates in the manufacturing sector itself, which indi-
cates the importance of interindustry linkages in the production of 
manufacturing goods. In Section Five, “Manufactures’ GVC Income 
by Production Factor,” we focus more in-depth on the role of differ-
ent factors of production. We show how in advanced countries GVC 
income generated by capital and high-skilled labor is increasing, while 
incomes for medium- and low-skilled workers in manufactures produc-
tion are declining. In Section Six, “Manufactures’ GVC Jobs,” we study 
the number of jobs involved in GVC production of manufactures and 
fi nd a strong difference between Europe and the United States. Low- 
and medium-skilled jobs are on the decline in all advanced countries, 
but whereas in Europe and Japan high-skilled job opportunities have 
increased, they have declined in the United States since 1995. 
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GVC INCOMES AND JOBS: METHODOLOGY
In this section we outline the method to slice up GVCs, as intro-
duced by Timmer et al. (2013). The basic aim of this empirical analysis 
is to decompose expenditure on a fi nal product into a stream of fac-
tor incomes around the world. By modeling the world economy as an 
input-output model in the tradition of Leontief, we can use his famous 
insight, which links up changes in consumption to changes in the dis-
tribution of factor income both within and across countries. Basically, 
we will provide the macroeconomic equivalent of famous product case 
studies that suggest a new division of labor and value in electronics, 
such as Dedrick, Kraemer, and Linden (2010) for iPods and electronic 
notebooks and Ali-Yrkkö et al. (2011) for a study of mobile phones. 
These studies suggest a division of activities between mature and 
emerging economies where the former concentrate on activities that 
require skilled labor and capital (in particular, intangibles), while the 
latter mainly contribute through unskilled labor.
The GVC income metric provides a macroeconomic complement 
to the product case studies described above. It covers a wide set of 
products and analyzes not only the fi rst-tier suppliers but also second-
tier and higher-order suppliers. The method provides a full decomposi-
tion of the value of consumption in a country and traces the associated 
income fl ows for labor and capital in various regions in the world. We 
model the global production system through input-output tables and 
international trade statistics. The approach follows the seminal insight 
from Leontief (1949) and traces the amount of factor inputs needed to 
produce a certain amount of fi nal demand. Value is added at various 
stages of production through the utilization of production factors such 
as labor and capital. These links between expenditure and income are 
illustrated in Figure 5.1. 
The arrows in Figure 5.1 indicate fl ows of products and factor ser-
vices, which are mirrored by payments that fl ow in the opposite direc-
tion. The central link between income and consumption is the production 
process, in which value is added through the deployment of labor and 
capital in the various stages of production. This production process can 
be highly fragmented, as the case study of the iPod illustrates. Through 
international trade, consumption in Country B will lead to income for 
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Figure 5.1  Links between Expenditure, Production, and Income 
Country A Consumption by A Production in A Capital and labor in A
Country B Consumption by B Production in B Capital and labor in B
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production factors in other countries, either through importing fi nal 
goods, or through the use of imported intermediates in the production 
process of Country B. Through these indirect linkages, consumption in 
Country A will generate income in Country C even though Country C 
does not trade directly with Country A. These indirect effects are siz-
able, as international trade in intermediate goods is high.
To model the international production linkages, we use a world 
input-output model that obeys the identity that at the global level con-
sumption is equal to all value-added generated.2 Below we will outline 
how this identity can be used to consistently decompose the value of 
consumption by a country into income in any country in the world. 
To do this we rely on the fundamental input-output identity introduced 
by Leontief (1949), which states that Q = BQ + C, where Q denotes 
outputs, C is consumption, and B is an input-output matrix with inter-
mediate input coeffi cients. B describes how a given product in a coun-
try is produced with different combinations of intermediate inputs. The 
identity states that a good produced is either used as an intermediate 
input in another production process or is consumed. It can be rewritten 
as Q = (I − B)−1C, with I being an identity matrix.3 (I − B)−1 is famously 
known as the Leontief inverse. It represents the total production value 
in all stages of production that is generated in the production process of 
one unit of consumption. 
To see this, let Z be a vector column, with the fi rst element rep-
resenting the global consumption of iPods produced in China, which 
is equal to the output of the Chinese iPod industry, and the rest zeros. 
Then BZ is the vector of intermediate inputs, both Chinese and foreign, 
needed to assemble the iPods in China, such as the hard-disc drive, 
battery, and processors. But these intermediates need to be produced as 
well. B2Z indicates the intermediate inputs directly needed to produce 
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represents all intermediate inputs needed for the iPod production. Then 
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up15shmg20ch5.indd   126 2/17/2015   1:17:10 PM
Incomes and Jobs in Global Production of Manufactures   127
Using this insight, we can derive production factor requirements 
for any vector Z. Let F be the direct factor inputs per unit of gross out-
put. An element in this matrix indicates the share in the value of gross 
output of a production factor used directly by the country to produce a 
given product. These are country- and industry-specifi c—one example 
would be the value of low-skilled labor used in the Chinese electronics 
industry to produce one dollar of output and to add up to value-added 
by construction in our data. The elements in F are direct factor inputs in 
the industry, because they do not account for value embodied in inter-
mediate inputs used by this industry. To include the latter as well, we 
multiply F by the total gross output value in all stages of production that 
is generated in the production process defi ned above, so that 
(5.1)  CBIFK 1)(  ,  
in which C indicates the levels of consumption4 and K is the matrix of 
amounts of factor inputs attributed to each consumption level. A typical 
element in K indicates the amount of a production factor f from country 
i, embodied in consumption of product g in country j. By the logic of 
Leontief’s insight, the sum of all elements in a column of K will be 
equal to the consumption of this product. Thus we have completed our 
decomposition of the value of consumption into the value-added by 
various production factors around the world.5
For the purpose of this chapter, we are also interested in the effects 
of foreign versus domestic fi nal demand for growth in GVC income and 
jobs. For a particular country i, we defi ne foreign fi nal demand (CFOR) 
and domestic fi nal demand (CDOM) so that CFOR + CDOM = C. Substitut-
ing this in the linear system given above, one can now derive the gross 
output generated because of fi nal demand from home country i, and that 
generated because of fi nal demand from other countries, so that 
(5.2)    FORDOMFORDOM KKCBIFCBIFK   11 )()( . 
 
In this equation, we have decomposed the amount of factors used in 
each sector of the home economy as given by K into the amount used 
to satisfy domestic fi nal demand (KDOM) and the amount used to sat-
isfy foreign demand (KFOR). The latter measures value-added exports, 
defi ned by Johnson and Noguera (2012) as the amount of value-added 
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produced in a given source country that is ultimately embodied in fi nal 
products absorbed abroad. 
In Table 5.1 we provide an example of a GVC decomposition for 
fi nal expenditures in the United States on electrical machinery in 1995 
and 2008. The expenditure value is given at the basic price concept. A 
key distinction in the System of National Accounts is between a value at 
basic prices and at purchasers’ prices. The latter is the price paid by the 
fi nal consumer and consists of the basic price plus trade and transport 
margins in the handling of the product and any (net) product taxes. The 
basic price can thus be considered as the price received by the producer 
of the good. In 1995, the share of the value added in the United States 
was over 50 percent, but this swiftly dropped in the period following 
that year. Instead, value was increasingly added in other parts in the 
world, both within NAFTA and outside. China in particular benefi ted 
from U.S. demand for electrical machinery and captured more than 20 
percent of the value in 2008. Partly this was by exporting fi nal goods to 
the United States that had been produced in China (direct contribution), 
but also it was accomplished indirectly through the production of inter-
mediates (such as parts and components) that are used in the United 
States and elsewhere to produce fi nal goods destined for the U.S. mar-
NOTE: Table shows breakdown of fi nal expenditure by households, fi rms, and govern-
ment in the United States on electrical machinery products (ISIC Rev. 3 industries 30 
to 33) into value-added in regions at basic prices, excluding domestic trade and trans-
port margins, and in billions of U.S. dollars, defl ated to 1995 prices with the overall 
U.S. CPI. “East Asia” includes Japan, South Korea, and Taiwan. “EU 27” includes all 
countries of the European Union.
SOURCE: Authors’ calculations based on World Input-Output Database, April 2012.
Table 5.1  V alue-Added in Final Expenditure on Electrical Products in 
United States (billions of 1995 US$)
1995 2008 Change
Total expenditure in US$, of which 217 253 36
   Domestic value-added 119 106 −13
   Foreign value-added, of which 98 147 49
     Canada and Mexico 10 15 5
     China 7 53 46
     East Asia 37 24 −13
     EU 27 19 28 9
     Other 25 27 2
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ket. The decline in value-added in Japan, South Korea, and Taiwan is 
illustrative of the major shifts that occurred in production stages across 
Asia as China was increasingly used as a production location by East 
Asian multinationals (Fukao, Ishido, and Ito 2003), an issue we will 
return to later.
THE WORLD INPUT-OUTPUT DATABASE (WIOD)
To implement the new GVC metrics, one needs to have a data-
base with linked consumption, production, and income fl ows within 
and between countries. For individual countries, this type of informa-
tion can be found in input-output tables. However, national tables do 
not provide any information on bilateral fl ows of goods and services 
between countries. For this type of information, researchers have to rely 
on data sets constructed on the basis of national input-output tables in 
combination with international trade data. Various alternative data sets 
have been built in the past, of which the Global Trade Analysis Proj-
ect (GTAP) database is the most widely known and used (Narayanan 
and Walmsley 2008). Other data sets are constructed by the Organisa-
tion for Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD; see Ahmad, 
Chapter 6 of this volume; IDE-JETRO (2006); and Yamano and Ahmad 
[2006]). However, all these databases provide only one or a limited 
number of benchmark year input-output tables, which preclude an anal-
ysis of developments over time. And although they provide separate 
import matrices, there is no detailed breakdown of imports by trade 
partner. 
For this chapter, we use a new database, called the World Input-
Output Database (WIOD), that aims to fi ll this gap. The WIOD pro-
vides a time series of world input-output tables from 1995 onwards, 
distinguishing between 35 industries and 59 product groups. The con-
struction of the world input-output tables will be discussed in the fol-
lowing subsection. Another crucial element for this type of analysis 
comes from detailed value-added accounts that provide information on 
the use of various types of labor (distinguished by educational attain-
ment level) and capital in production. This is discussed in the subsec-
tion titled “Factor Input Requirements.”
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World Input-Output Tables: Concepts and Construction
In this subsection we outline the basic concepts and construction 
of our world input-output tables. Basically, a world input-output table 
(WIOT) is a combination of national input-output tables in which the 
use of products is broken down according to their origin. In contrast 
to the national input-output tables, this information is made explicit in 
the WIOT. For each country, fl ows of products both for intermediate 
and fi nal use are split into domestically produced or imported. In addi-
tion, for imports, the WIOT shows which foreign industry produced 
the product. This is illustrated by the schematic outline for a WIOT in 
Table 5.2. It illustrates the simple case of three regions: 1) Country A, 
2) Country B, and 3) the rest of the world. In the World Input-Output 
Database we will distinguish between 40 individual countries and the 
rest of the world, but the basic outline remains the same.
The rows in the WIOT indicate the use of output from a particular 
industry in a country. This can be intermediate use either in the country 
itself (use of domestic output) or by other countries (in which case it is 
exported). Output can also be for fi nal use,6 either by the country itself 
(fi nal use of domestic output) or by other countries (in which case it is 
exported). Final use is indicated on the right side of the table, and this 
information can be used to measure the C matrix defi ned in Section 
Two, “GVC Incomes and Jobs: Methodology.” The sum of all of the 
uses is equal to the output of an industry, denoted by Q in Section Two. 
A fundamental accounting identity is that total use of output in a row 
equals total output of the same industry, as indicated in the respective 
column in the left-hand part of the table. The columns convey informa-
tion on the technology of production, as they indicate the amounts of 
intermediate and factor inputs needed for production. The intermedi-
ates can be sourced from domestic industries or imported. This is the B 
matrix from Section Two. The residual between total output and total 
intermediate inputs is value-added. This is made up by compensation 
for production factors. It is the direct contribution of domestic factors 
to output. We prepare the F matrix from Section Two on this infor-
mation after breaking out the compensation of various factor inputs as 
described in the next subsection, “Factor Input Requirements.”
As building blocks for the WIOT, national supply-and-use tables 
(SUTs) were used; these are the core statistical sources from which 
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Table 5.2  Schematic Outline of World Input-Output Table (WIOT), Three Regions
Intermediate industry Final domestic
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national statistical institutes (NSIs) derive national input-output tables. 
In short, we derive time series from national SUTs. Benchmark national 
SUTs are linked over time through the use of the most recent National 
Accounts statistics on fi nal demand categories, as well as through the 
use of gross output and value-added by detailed industry. This ensures 
both intercountry and intertemporal consistency of the tables. As 
such, the WIOT is built according to the conventions of the System of 
National Accounts and obeys various important accounting identities. 
National SUTs are linked across countries through detailed international 
trade statistics to create so-called international SUTs. This is based on 
a classifi cation of bilateral import fl ows by end-use category (interme-
diate, consumer, or investment), in which intermediate inputs are split 
by country of origin. These international SUTs are used to construct 
the symmetric world input-output of the industry-by-industry type. 
See Timmer (2012) for a more elaborate discussion of construction 
methods, practical implementation, and detailed sources of the WIOT. 
Dietzenbacher et al. (2013) provide an in-depth technical discussion. 
The construction of the WIOT has a number of distinct charac-
teristics. First, we rely on national supply-and-use tables rather than 
input-output tables as our basic building blocks. SUTs are a natural 
starting point for this type of analysis, as they provide information on 
both products and industries. A supply table provides information on 
products produced by each domestic industry, and a use table indicates 
the use of each product by an industry or fi nal user. The linking with 
international trade data, which is product-based, and with factor use, 
which is industry-based, can be naturally made in an SUT framework.7 
Ideally, we would like to use offi cial data on the destination of 
imported goods and services. However, in most countries these fl ows 
are not tracked by statistical agencies. Nevertheless, for imports, most 
do publish an input-output table constructed with the import propor-
tionality assumption, applying a product’s economy-wide import share 
for all use categories. For the United States, researchers have found that 
this assumption can be rather misleading, in particular at the industry 
level (Feenstra and Jensen 2012; Strassner, Yuskavage, and Lee 2009). 
Therefore, we are not using the offi cial import matrices but instead use 
detailed trade data to make a split. Our basic data are the bilateral import 
fl ows of all countries covered in WIOD from all partners in the world 
at the HS6-digit product level, taken from the UN Comtrade database. 
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Based on the detailed description, products are allocated to three use 
categories: 1) intermediates, 2) fi nal consumption, and 3) investment, 
effectively extending the UN Broad Economic Categories (BEC) clas-
sifi cation. We fi nd that import proportions differ widely across use cat-
egories and, importantly, also across country of origin. For example, 
imports by the Czech car industry from Germany contain a much higher 
share of intermediates than imports from Japan. This type of informa-
tion is refl ected in our WIOT by using detailed bilateral trade data. The 
domestic use matrix is derived as total use minus imports.
Another novel element in the WIOT is the use of data on trade in 
services. As yet, no standardized database on bilateral service fl ows 
exists. These fl ows have been collected from various sources—includ-
ing the OECD, Eurostat, the International Monetary Fund (IMF), and 
the World Trade Organization (WTO)—checked for consistency, and 
integrated into a bilateral service trade database. 
Clearly, the validity of the fi ndings in this chapter relies heavily 
on the quality of the databases used. The WIOD has been constructed 
with the aim of making maximum use of the publicly available data 
on national input-output tables, international trade statistics, and pro-
duction factor incomes. In the process of consolidating these separate 
databases, inconsistencies have been found and compromises made to 
arrive at an internally consistent world input-output table. For example, 
the well-known inconsistency between mirror trade fl ows in the UN 
Comtrade data was resolved by focusing on import fl ows only. Other 
issues relate to reexports of goods and trade in services that are not 
very well refl ected in today’s trade statistics. It is clear that present-
day statistical systems are lagging behind the developments in today’s 
world. In particular, trade in services and intangibles such as royalties 
and licences are still poorly refl ected (see, e.g., Feenstra et al. [2010]; 
Houseman and Ryder [2010]). This should have priority in the future 
development of international trade statistics.
Factor Input Requirements
For factor input requirements, we collected country-specifi c data 
on detailed labor and capital inputs. This includes data on hours worked 
and on compensation for three labor types, as well as data on capital 
stocks and compensation. Labor types are distinguished on the basis 
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of educational attainment levels, as defi ned in the International Stan-
dard Classifi cation of Education (ISCED) (low-skilled: ISCED 1 + 2; 
medium-skilled: ISCED 3 + 4; and high-skilled: ISCED 5 + 6). These 
series are not part of the core set of national accounts statistics reported 
by NSIs, and additional material has been collected from employment 
and labor force statistics. For each country covered, we chose what we 
considered the best statistical source for consistent wage and employ-
ment data at the industry level. In most countries, this was the labor 
force survey (LFS). In most cases this needed to be combined with 
an earnings survey, as information on wages is often not included in 
the LFS. In other instances, an establishment survey or social secu-
rity database was used. Care has been taken to arrive at series that are 
time-consistent, as most employment surveys are not designed to track 
developments over time, and breaks in methodology or coverage fre-
quently occur. 
Labor compensation of self-employed persons is not registered in 
the National Accounts, which, as emphasised by Krueger (1999), leads 
to an understatement of labor’s share. This is particularly important 
for less advanced economies, which typically feature a large share of 
self-employed workers in industries like agriculture, trade, business, 
and personal services. We make an imputation by assuming that the 
compensation per hour of self-employment is equal to the compensa-
tion per hour of employees. For most advanced countries, labor data 
is constructed by extending and updating the EU KLEMS database 
(www.euklems.net) using the methodologies, data sources, and con-
cepts described in O’Mahony and Timmer (2009). For other countries 
additional data has been collected according to the same principles. 
Capital compensation is derived as gross value-added minus labor 
compensation, as defi ned above. It is the gross compensation for capi-
tal, including profi ts and depreciation allowances. Being a residual 
measure, it is the remuneration for capital in the broadest sense, includ-
ing tangible capital (such as machinery and buildings), intangible (such 
as research and development [R&D], software, database development, 
branding, and organizational capital), mineral resources, land, and 
fi nancial capital. 
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TRENDS IN GVC INCOMES OF MANUFACTURES 
In this section, we explore trends in the distributions of value in 
global production chains using the decompositions introduced in Sec-
tion Two. We decompose global expenditure on manufacturing prod-
ucts into compensation for factor services that are directly or indirectly 
needed in the production of these products. Throughout the chapter we 
use the phrase “global manufacturing” to indicate the set of all produc-
tion activities directly or indirectly needed in producing fi nal manufac-
turing goods. Note that this includes not only activities in the manufac-
turing sector but also production activities in all other sectors, such as 
agriculture, utilities, business services, and so on, that provide inputs in 
any stage of the production process. Next, we defi ne “GVC income” as 
the income of all production factors that have been directly and indi-
rectly used in the production of fi nal manufacturing goods. World GVC 
income is the GVC income summed over all countries; it will be equal 
to world expenditure on manufacturing goods as we model all regions 
in the world in our empirical analysis. By defi nition, any dollar spent 
on fi nal goods must end up as income for production factors somewhere 
in the world. 
The share of a country in world GVC income is a novel indicator of 
the competitive strength of a nation. Compared to traditional competi-
tiveness indicators like a country’s share in world exports, it has three 
advantages. First, it indicates to what extent a country can compete 
with other nations in terms of activities related to global manufactur-
ing, rather than competing in manufacturing products as measured by 
exports. Second, it is a refl ection of an economy’s strength to compete 
in both domestic and global markets. Countries might gain income by 
serving foreign demand, but might at the same time lose income in 
production for the domestic market. The income share of a country in 
global manufacturing measures the combined net effect. Third, income 
and employment effects of trade in tasks for separate groups of workers 
(such as low- and high-skilled) can also be determined in the same uni-
fi ed framework, as shown later on. 
Throughout the chapter we will focus on GVC income in the pro-
duction of fi nal manufacturing goods. We denote these goods by the 
up15shmg20ch5.indd   135 2/17/2015   1:17:11 PM
136   Timmer, Los, and de Vries
term “manufactures.” Production systems of manufactures are highly 
prone to international fragmentation, as activities have a high degree 
of international contestability: They can be undertaken in any coun-
try with little variation in quality. It is important to note that GVCs of 
manufactures do not coincide with all activities in the manufacturing 
sector; neither do they coincide with all activities that are internation-
ally contestable. Some activities in the manufacturing sector are geared 
toward production of intermediates for fi nal nonmanufacturing prod-
ucts and are not part of GVCs of manufactures. On the other hand, 
GVCs of manufactures also include value-added outside the manufac-
turing sector (such as business services, transport, and communication 
and fi nance) and value-added in raw materials production. These indi-
rect contributions will be explicitly accounted for through the modeling 
of input-output linkages across sectors. 
Ideally, to measure competitiveness one would like to cover value-
added in all activities that are internationally contestable, and not only 
those in the production of manufactures.8 GVCs of services cannot be 
analyzed, however, as the level of observation for services in our data 
is not fi ne enough to zoom in on those services that are heavily traded, 
such as consultancy services. The lowest level of detail in the WIOD 
is “business services,” which for the most part contains activities that 
are not internationally traded, and hence are much less interesting to 
analyze from a GVC perspective. This is all the more true for other 
services, such as personal or retail services. They require a physical 
interaction between the buyer and the provider of the service, and a 
major part of the value-added in these chains is effectively not interna-
tionally contestable. More detailed data on trade in, and production of, 
services is needed before meaningful GVC analyses of fi nal services 
can be made. 
GVC Incomes of Manufactures 
Figure 5.2, Panel A, provides a comparison of the GVC incomes in 
advanced and emerging regions in the production of fi nal manufactur-
ing goods. The GVC income share of advanced countries (East Asia 
plus the United States, Canada, Australia, and the EU15) has declined 
from almost three-quarters in 1995 to just above half of world GVC 
income today. Emerging regions have rapidly increased their shares, 
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and almost all of this increase was realized after 2003. Since 2004 the 
increase in the GVC income of emerging countries has always been 
higher than that of advanced countries, reaching a peak in 2008 at a 
time when advanced countries’ GVC income stalled. The drop in the 
crisis year of 2009 was large for all countries, but recovery occurred 
much faster in the emerging economies (Figure 5.2, Panel B).
One might hypothesize that shifts in the composition of global man-
ufacturing demand in terms of the type of products being demanded 
might also be a determinant of the decline of the advanced nations in 
global manufacturing production. However, the product structure of 
global demand remained stable over the period 1995 to 2009. Follow-
ing Engel’s law, the expenditure shares of food and other nondurable 
goods, such as apparel, shoes, furniture, and toys, were on a long-term 
declining trend. Expenditure on machinery and transport equipment was 
relatively stable, around 16 percent of the total, as increasing consumer 
and investment demand from emerging markets was counteracted by 
declining demand from mature economies. Also, demand for electrical 
machinery was stagnant in the long run. The only clear upward trend 
is found for chemical products—including gasoline, cosmetics, and 
medicines—demand for which has steadily increased around the world, 
going from 12 percent of global manufacturing expenditures in 1995 
to 15 percent in 2008. But these global demand shifts are too small 
to account for the decline in advanced nations’ GVC income. Instead, 
this decline is due to losses in the amount of value-added in each prod-
uct’s GVC. This will be analyzed in more detail in the remainder of this 
section. 
In Figure 5.3 we show the shares of regions in world GVC income 
in the production of manufactures for the period from 1995 to 2011. 
The fi gure plots measures for fi ve groups of countries: 1) members of 
the North American Free Trade Agreement (NAFTA) (Canada, Mexico, 
and the United States); 2) the European Union (EU), consisting of the 
27 EU member states; 3) East Asia, consisting of Japan, South Korea, 
and Taiwan; 4) China; and 5) BRIIAT, which includes Brazil, Russia, 
India, Indonesia, Australia, and Turkey. In Table 5.3, additional data 
for 20 major individual economies can be found for 1995 and 2008. It 
should be kept in mind that international competition is not a zero-sum 
game, and declining shares in global GVC do not necessarily mean an 
absolute decline in GVC income in a region. On the contrary, in real 
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terms, world GVC income on manufactures (defl ated by the U.S. Con-
sumer Price Index) rose by about one-third over the period 1995–2008. 
Figure 5.3 illustrates that the share of the NAFTA countries in world 
GVC income increased during the ICT bubble years, climbing as high 
as 30 percent, at which point their share was even higher than that of 
the EU. But it rapidly declined after 2001, reaching a low of 20 per-
cent in 2008. The decline of the advanced nations taken as a whole 
is particularly due to the demise of East Asia, whose share has been 
dropping rapidly since the mid-1990s. While the shares of South Korea 
and Taiwan are still increasing, the GVC income share of Japan has 
been declining precipitously. In contrast, the EU’s GVC income share 
has been relatively stable, only declining slowly over the period from 
1995 to 2008. France, Italy, and the United Kingdom slowly lost some 
shares. The German share dropped rapidly in the latter 1990s but sta-
bilized afterwards. These drops were compensated for by increasing 
shares for other EU countries, in particular the new member states. As is 
well known, the aftermath of the global fi nancial crisis hit Europe par-
Figure 5.2  GVC Incomes in Advanced and Emerging Countries, All 
Manufactures, 1995–2011
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ticularly hard, and its share dropped sharply, from 32 percent in 2003 
to 24 percent in 2011. On the fl ip side, the share of other regions in the 
world rapidly increased. China is mainly responsible for the increase 
of the emerging countries’ share, because its share accelerated after its 
ascension to the WTO in 2000. In 2007 it overtook East Asia in terms 
of share. In 2009 the Chinese GVC income share overtook that of the 
combined countries of BRIIAT. And in 2011 its share was almost equal 
to that of the NAFTA region.9 
One might argue that these shifts in regional GVC income shares 
are unsurprising, given the faster growth of China and other emerg-
NOTE: “Advanced” nations include the EU15, Japan, Korea, Taiwan, Australia, Can-
ada, and the United States. “Emerging” nations include all other countries in the 
world. National currencies have been converted to U.S. dollars with offi cial exchange 
rates, defl ated to 1995 prices with the U.S. Consumer Price Index (CPI). World GVC 
income is equal to world expenditures on manufacturing products at basic prices.
SOURCE: Authors’ calculations based on World Input-Output Database. Series updated 
to 2011 in April 2012. 
Panel B: Annual change (in billions of 1995 US$)
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ing economies vis-à-vis advanced regions. Higher consumption in the 
home economy would naturally lead to higher GVC incomes. But this is 
only true to the extent that demand for manufactures has a strong home 
production bias—that is, a bias mainly geared toward goods with a high 
level of domestic value-added. Given the high tradability of manufac-
turing goods, this home bias is not obvious, however. Increased Chinese 
demand for, say, chemicals or electronic equipment can be as easily 
served by imports as by Chinese domestic production. And in the lat-
ter case, a sizable share could still be captured by advanced countries 
Figure 5.3  Regional Shares in World GVC Income, All Manufactures, 
1995–2011 (%)
NOTE: Figure shows value-added by regions in the production of fi nal manufactur-
ing goods. “East Asia” includes Japan, South Korea, and Taiwan. “BRIIAT” includes 
Brazil, Russia, India, Indonesia, Australia, and Turkey. “EU27” includes all countries 
that have joined the European Union. “NAFTA” includes Canada, Mexico, and the 
United States. Shares do not add up to 100 percent, as the remainder is the share of all 
other countries in the world.
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through the delivery of key intermediate inputs and services. The occur-
rence of falling shares in global GVC income for advanced regions in 
Figure 5.2 indicates that these regions failed to capture a large part of 
the value of the increased market for manufacturing goods in emerging 
Table 5.3  Real GVC Income, All Manufactures (in billions of 1995 US$) 
Country 1995 2008 Change
Advanced nations
United States 1,312 1,373 62
Japan 1,154 676 −478
Germany 618 664 46
France 292 330 37
United Kingdom 254 260 6
Italy 289 353 64
Spain 126 171 44
Canada 124 190 66
Australia 68 112 45
South Korea 142 157 15
Netherlands 94 119 25
Other 10 advanced 390 459 69
Total 2l advanced 4,863 4,864 1
Emerging nations
China 277 1,114 837
Russian Federation 80 246 166
Brazil 164 265 101
India 114 229 115
Mexico 99 208 109
Turkey 73 122 49
Indonesia 83 113 30
Poland 33 86 52
Czech Republic 14 41 27
Rest of world 786 1,396 610
Total emerging countries 1,723 3,820 2,097
World 6,586 8,684 2,098
NOTE: Real GVC indicates the value-added in countries to global output of fi nal manu-
factures. It includes all manufactures and is in constant 1995 prices using the U.S. 
Consumer Price Index (CPI) as the defl ator.  Some numbers in “Change” column may 
be off by 1 because of rounding.
SOURCE: Authors’ calculations based on World Input-Output Database, April 2012.
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economies. At the same time, the domestic value-added content of their 
own production declined. Both trends can be interpreted as a loss of 
competitiveness.
A number of caveats are in order. Shares in world GVC income 
are expressed in U.S. dollars using current exchange rates. For income 
changes over time, we defl ate incomes in U.S. dollars to the 1995 U.S. 
dollar value using the U.S. Consumer Price Index (CPI). Exchange 
rates have fl uctuated over the period considered: The dollar-to-euro 
rate10 declined sharply over 1995–2001, followed by a steep rise, which 
by 2007 had returned it to near its 1995 value. The yen-to-dollar rate 
fl uctuated around a long-term constant for this period. The yuan-to-
dollar rate was effectively constant over this period, slightly appreciat-
ing at the end of the 2000s. The choice of the U.S. dollar as numéraire 
has no impact on the GVC income measure of a country relative to 
other countries. For example, expressing GVC income shares in yen or 
euros would give identical results. But it will affect the absolute levels 
of GVC incomes and hence comparisons over time within a country. 
Second, one has to keep in mind that the location where the value is 
being added is not necessarily identical to where the generated income 
will eventually end up. The building of global production chains is not 
only through arms-length trade in intermediate inputs; it also involves 
sizable fl ows of investment, and part of the value-added in emerging 
regions will accrue as income to multinational fi rms headquartered in 
advanced regions through the ownership of capital. What is needed is to 
analyze capital income on a national rather than a domestic basis, as this 
chapter does in its data on foreign ownership. This type of information 
is notoriously hard to acquire, not least because of the notional relo-
cation of profi ts for tax accounting purposes. Hence, further research 
is needed in this area (Baldwin and Kimura 1998; Lipsey 2010). The 
decline in East Asian GVC income is likely overestimated, as it is 
also related to the offshoring of activities to China, which effectively 
became the assembly place of East Asia. Income earned by East Asian 
capital is allocated to the place of production (in this case China) and 
not by ownership, as discussed in Section Two. This difference is prob-
ably larger for East Asian countries than for NAFTA or the EU, which 
have larger FDI fl ows within the region, so that they net out in regional 
aggregate numbers.
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The Role of Domestic and Foreign Demand
By splitting the fi nal demand vector in the decomposition given in 
Equation (5.2), we can analyze the importance of domestic versus for-
eign fi nal demand in the generation of GVC income in a country. The 
GVC income due to foreign demand is identical to what Johnson and 
Noguera (2012) refer to as “exports of value-added.”11 Table 5.4 pro-
vides the share of GVC income of manufactures due to foreign demand 
for 20 major economies in the world. The overriding conclusion is that 
all countries have become increasingly dependent on foreign demand 
Table 5.4  Percentage of Real GVC Income Due to Foreign Demand, All 
Manufactures 
Country 1995 2008 Change
Advanced nations
United States 25.9 33.0 7.1
Japan 24.6 41.8 17.2
Germany 46.3 69.9 23.6
France 53.1 60.0 7.0
United Kingdom 52.6 68.5 15.8
Italy 45.2 52.8 7.6
Spain 39.1 53.3 14.2
Canada 65.8 65.8 0.0
Australia 43.9 55.3 11.3
South Korea 45.2 67.8 22.6
Netherlands 79.3 87.8 8.5
Emerging nations
China 35.3 48.7 13.5
Russian Federation 42.6 47.3 4.7
Brazil 15.7 26.0 10.3
India 17.7 29.3 11.6
Mexico 32.9 36.5 3.5
Turkey 22.5 35.3 12.8
Indonesia 28.5 38.7 10.2
Poland 42.7 63.0 20.3
NOTE: Numbers represent real GVC income for all manufactures and in constant 1995 
prices using the U.S. Consumer Price Index (CPI) as a defl ator. Some numbers in the 
“Change” column may be off by 0.1 because of rounding.
SOURCE: Authors’ calculations based on World Input-Output Database, April 2012.
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to generate GVC income of manufactures, with the exception of Can-
ada. For all major mature economies, increases in foreign demand have 
been a necessary spur for slow or even negative growth in their value-
added shares in domestic demand. Domestic demand was not a source 
of growth in the United States, and it contributed strongly to negative 
growth in Japan, as import substitution took place against a backdrop of 
stagnating domestic demand. The direction of this trend for advanced 
countries was to be expected, as the income elasticity of demand for 
manufactures is low, and in most countries domestic demand is increas-
ingly served through imports with high foreign value-added. But this 
domestic decline was more than counteracted by a rapid increase in 
exports of value-added. The most extreme example of this shift toward 
foreign demand dependence is to be found in Germany, given the large 
size of its domestic market. In 1995, 46 percent of its GVC income 
was due to foreign fi nal demand, and by 2008 this had increased to 70 
percent. Also, dependence upon foreign demand in Japan, South Korea, 
Spain, and the United Kingdom rapidly increased over this period. 
For emerging economies, changes in foreign demand have been 
important, but they also have strongly benefi ted from growth in domes-
tic expenditure on manufacturing. In China, the share of GVC income 
due to foreign demand increased from 35 percent to 49 percent—which 
is high, but not outstanding when compared to that of countries of com-
parable size such as Japan or Germany. The share of foreign demand in 
Mexico and Russia did barely increase over this period; also, the share 
for India, while growing, is still at a relatively low level, indicating that 
the integration of these major emerging economies into world markets 
is still limited. 
Sectoral Origin of GVC Income of Manufactures
The production of manufacturing goods involves a wide variety of 
activities, which do not take place only in the manufacturing sector. 
Using the decomposition technique outlined above, one can trace not 
only the country but also the sector in which value is added during the 
production process. Typically, the value that is added through activities 
in the manufacturing sector itself is around half the basic price value 
of a good, and declines over time. In Table 5.5 we provide for each 
country the share of a sector in the total value added by the country in 
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global manufacturing expenditure. This is done for 20 major econo-
mies in 1995 and 2008, distinguishing between three broad sectors: 1) 
natural resources, including the agriculture and mining industries (ISIC 
Rev. 3 industries A to C), 2) manufacturing, including all manufacturing 
industries (D), and 3) services including all other industries (E to Q). 
The table shows that the share of manufacturing has declined between 
1995 and 2008 in all countries except South Korea and Mexico. The 
Table 5.5  Sectoral Shares in Total GVC Income, All Manufactures (% of 
total)
Natural resources Manufacturing  Services
Country 1995 2008  1995 2008  1995 2008
Advanced
United States  0.06  0.09  0.56  0.52  0.38  0.39 
Japan  0.04  0.03  0.65  0.62  0.31  0.35 
Germany  0.03  0.02  0.61  0.56  0.36  0.42 
France  0.07  0.04  0.48  0.45  0.46  0.51 
United Kingdom  0.07  0.07  0.60  0.48  0.34  0.45 
Italy  0.05  0.03  0.57  0.52  0.38  0.44 
Spain  0.09  0.05  0.54  0.51  0.37  0.43 
Canada  0.12  0.19  0.54  0.44  0.34  0.37 
Australia  0.20  0.26  0.42  0.34  0.37  0.39 
South Korea  0.10  0.04  0.62  0.67  0.28  0.29 
Netherlands  0.11  0.12  0.49  0.42  0.40  0.45 
Emerging
China  0.21  0.17  0.58  0.57  0.22  0.26 
Russian Federation  0.20  0.21  0.42  0.39  0.38  0.40 
Brazil  0.13  0.17  0.55  0.46  0.32  0.37 
India  0.22  0.18  0.42  0.41  0.35  0.40 
Mexico  0.21  0.22  0.49  0.49  0.30  0.29 
Turkey  0.09  0.13  0.64  0.52  0.27  0.36 
Indonesia  0.22  0.30  0.61  0.54  0.18  0.16 
Poland  0.15  0.10  0.53  0.49  0.32  0.42 
NOTE: The numbers represent the share of that sector in total value-added by a coun-
try’s production of fi nal manufacturing products. “Natural resource” includes the 
agriculture and mining industries (ISIC Rev. 3 industries A to C), “manufacturing” 
includes all manufacturing industries (D), and “services” all other industries (E to Q).
SOURCE: Authors’ calculations based on World Input-Output Database, April 2012.
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unweighted average share across all 20 countries declined from 54 per-
cent to 50 percent. This partly refl ects a shift away from traditional 
manufacturing activities, such as those carried out by blue-collar 
production workers, but also the outsourcing of white-collar activi-
ties by manufacturing fi rms to domestic services fi rms. Contributions 
from the natural resources sector are high and have increased over the 
1995–2008 period in countries such as Australia, Canada, Indonesia, 
Mexico, Russia,12 and Turkey. This pattern of value-added suggests that 
for resource-abundant countries, activities within manufacturing pro-
duction networks are reinforcing their comparative advantage. Given 
India’s low level of development, services contribute relatively much 
in that country, refl ecting its well-developed business services sector, 
which delivers intermediate services to both domestic and foreign man-
ufacturing fi rms. In China, the share of natural resources is declining, 
and activities in the services sector are starting to contribute more, but 
the level is still well below the contributions of services in Europe and 
the United States.
GVC INCOME OF MANUFACTURES BY 
PRODUCTION FACTOR
Our income data on labor and capital allow us to study which pro-
duction factors have benefi ted from the changes in the regional distri-
bution of global value-added. Increasing trade and integration of world 
markets have been related to increasing unemployment and stagnat-
ing relative wages of low- and medium-skilled workers in developed 
regions. On the other hand, those factors have offered new opportunities 
in developing regions for countries to employ their large supply of low-
skilled workers. To study these trends, we decomposed value-added 
into four parts: 1) income for capital and income for labor, further split 
into 2) low-, 3) medium- and 4) high-skilled labor. High-skilled labor 
is defi ned as workers with a college degree or above. Medium-skilled 
workers have secondary schooling or above, including professional 
qualifi cations but below a college degree, and low-skilled have below 
secondary schooling. An estimate for the income of self-employed 
workers is included in labor compensation. The income for capital is 
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the amount of value-added that remains after subtracting labor com-
pensation. It is the gross compensation for capital, including profi ts and 
depreciation allowances. As a residual measure, it is the remuneration 
for capital in the broadest sense, including tangible, intangible, mineral 
resources, land, and fi nancial capital. 
In Figure 5.4 and Table 5.6 we provide a breakdown of GVC income 
by labor and capital for major regions. This is a breakdown of the GVC 
income discussed in the previous section, “Trends in Manufactures’ 
GVC Incomes.” At the global level, the share of GVC income that goes 
to labor is coming down, while the share of capital is increasing. In 
all regions, the compensation for capital is increasing relative to labor. 
Particularly in emerging regions, this increase is important and occurs 
faster than the labor income increase. This might be related to the low 
wage/rental ratios in these regions, which are still characterized by an 
abundant surplus of low-skilled workers from agricultural and informal 
urban sectors. In advanced regions, the increasing importance of capital 
might be a refl ection of the increased investment in so-called intan-
gible assets, which are becoming increasingly important for growth in 
advanced nations (Corrado and Hulten 2010).
It is important to note that the share captured by capital in emerg-
ing markets is known to be overestimated. Our approach is based on 
domestic production accounting for the location of the production fac-
tor and is silent on the ownership, as discussed before. In the case of 
labor income, this is unproblematic, since for most countries cross-
border labor migration is relatively minor. Hence, labor income paid 
out in a particular country mostly benefi ts the workers of the country in 
which production takes place. 
Worldwide, medium- and low-skilled workers are losing out to 
high-skilled workers, as the latter’s share of GVC income is increas-
ing. As expected, GVC income for low-skilled workers has increased 
strongly in China and in other emerging economies while declining in 
the advanced regions. In the United States and East Asia, the decline was 
particularly pronounced for medium-skilled workers. Within Europe, 
medium-skilled workers in Germany lost the biggest share, and in other 
European countries the income share going to low-skilled workers also 
declined. Income for high-skilled workers related to global manufac-
turing went up in most EU countries. This is not simply the result of a 
strong supply of higher-skilled labor replacing medium-skilled workers 
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NOTE: Figure shows factor income earned by high-skilled labor and capital (HS + K) and 
by medium- and low-skilled labor (MS + LS). “EU27” includes all countries in the Euro-
pean Union. “BRIIMT” includes Brazil, Russia, India, Indonesia, Mexico, and Turkey.
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Figure 5.4  GVC Income by Production Factor (in millions of 1995 US$), 
Change between 1995 and 2008
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by capital Value-added total
 1995 2008  1995 2008  1995 2008
EU27 21.5 18.9 9.7 9.8 31.2 28.7
United States 12.8 9.5 7.4 6.7 20.2 16.2
East Asia 12.9 6.1 8.1 4.6 21.0 10.7
China 2.0 5.2 2.1 7.8 4.2 13.0
BRIIMT 4.1 6.1 5.1 7.4 9.3 13.5
Other 6.4 7.3 7.9 10.6 14.3 17.9
World 59.7 53.1 40.3 46.9 100.0 100.0
Advanced 47.1 34.4 25.5 21.2 72.6 55.5








 1995 2008  1995 2008  1995 2008
EU27 4.8 6.0 10.0 8.9 6.6 4.0
United States 4.3 4.1 7.4 4.9 1.1 0.5
East Asia 3.2 2.1 7.2 3.3 2.5 0.6
China 0.1 0.4 0.7 1.8 1.3 3.0
BRIIMT 0.8 1.4 1.7 3.0 1.7 1.7
Other 0.8 1.5 2.3 2.9 3.4 3.0
World 14.0 15.5 29.1 24.8 16.6 12.8
Advanced 12.4 12.2 24.8 17.2 10.0 5.0
Emerging 1.6 3.3  4.3 7.6  6.6 7.8
NOTE: “East Asia” includes Japan, South Korea, and Taiwan. “EU27” designates the 
countries that had joined the EU as of January 1, 2013. “BRIIMT” includes Brazil, 
Russia, India, Indonesia, Mexico, and Turkey. “Other” is the rest of the world. Skill 
categories classify workers by their educational attainment levels. World income is 
equal to world expenditures on manufacturing products at basic prices. Some numbers 
may not sum to total because of rounding.
SOURCE: Authors’ calculations based on World Input-Output Database, April 2012.
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but essentially carrying out the same activities; if this were the case, the 
wages for high-skilled workers should have dropped and the increase 
in GVC income for high-skilled workers would be limited. However, 
relative wages for high-skilled workers did not show this pattern (see 
Timmer et al. 2013).
GVC JOBS IN MANUFACTURES
Many policy concerns surrounding globalization issues are ulti-
mately about jobs—good jobs in particular. The disappearance of 
manufacturing jobs in advanced nations is occasionally linked to pro-
duction fragmentation and the associated offshoring of activities; see 
Bardhan, Jaffee, and Kroll (2013) for an overview. It is thus useful to 
look at the structure of employment in global value chains and ana-
lyze the changes in the characteristics of workers directly and indirectly 
involved in the production of manufacturing goods—in short, GVC 
jobs in manufactures.13 For each country, we will measure the num-
ber of workers involved in the domestic territory. As the mobility of 
labor is much lower than that of capital, GVC jobs will be closer to a 
national concept than GVC income. We will characterize GVC work-
ers by sector of employment and level of skills. In the next subsection, 
“The Shift toward Service Jobs in GVCs of Manufactures,” we show 
that only about half of the workers in manufacturing GVCs are actually 
employed in the manufacturing sector. The other half are employed in 
nonmanufacturing industries delivering intermediates, and this share is 
growing. In most countries, GVC job increase in services is even higher 
than job loss in manufacturing. In the subsection titled “Specialization 
in High-Skilled Activities in Advanced Countries,” on p. 154, we ana-
lyze the skill structure of GVC workers and fi nd that there has been a 
shift away from low-skilled toward high-skilled workers for advanced 
nations. This increase is faster than the trend in the overall economy, 
suggesting increased specialization of advanced countries in GVC 
activities performed by high-skilled workers. This is in line with broad 
Heckscher-Ohlin predictions of which countries will see a comparative 
advantage when possibilities for international production fragmentation 
increase.
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The Shift Toward Service Jobs in GVCs of Manufactures
By using the number of workers rather than value-added per unit 
of output in each industry-country as the requirement vector in Equa-
tion (5.1), we can trace the number of workers directly and indirectly 
involved in the production of manufacturing goods, and their sector of 
employment. Developments in the 20 main countries over the period 
from 1995 to 2008 are shown in Table 5.7. The fi rst two columns indi-
cate the share of manufacturing GVC workers as a percentage of the 
overall workforce in the economy. In the next columns the sectoral 
structure of employment of these workers is shown. Three sectors are 
considered—1) agriculture, 2) manufacturing and 3) services (which 
also include mining, construction, and utilities)—followed by a fourth 
column for “All sectors.” The fi rst set of four columns refers to the 
absolute number of GVC workers by sector in 2008, while the latter set 
of four columns refers to the change over the period 1995–2008. Two 
main facts clearly stand out: 
 1) The declining importance of global production of manufac-
tures for overall employment in most advanced nations 
 2) The strong shift in the sector of employment of these workers 
away from the manufacturing sector toward the services sec-
tor 
The fi rst two columns of Table 5.7 show the decline in importance 
of GVCs of manufactures in providing jobs in the economies of all 
countries except China and Turkey. The job losses in Japan and the 
United States are major, around 2.9 and 4.6 million, respectively. Also, 
job loss in the United Kingdom stands out, as more than 1.6 million 
GVC jobs disappeared in that country alone. The only exception to this 
trend in advanced countries is Germany: In 2008, 26 percent of German 
employment was involved in the global production of manufactures, 
which is the highest share across all advanced countries. 
Another important fi nding on the basis of Table 5.7 is the strong 
shift toward service jobs in the global production of manufactures since 
1995. Faster growth (or slower declines) in service jobs than in manu-
facturing can be seen in all major advanced countries. As a result, in 
2008, the manufacturing sector accounted for about half of the total 
number of GVC jobs in manufactures in advanced countries. The other 
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manufactures, as  
share of all workers 
in the economy (%)
GVC workers in manufactures in 2008 
(in thousands), employed in
Change in GVC workers in 
manufactures between 1995 and 2008 
(in thousands), employed in
Agriculture
Manufac-
turing Services All sectors Agriculture
Manufac-
turing Services All sectors1995 2008
Advanced
United States 16.0 11.1 1,143 8,837 6,892 16,872 −331 −3,144 −1,138 −4,612
Japan 22.6 19.4 1,298 6,491 4,417 12,207 −794 −2,225 148 −2,871
Germany 26.8 26.4 400 5,481 4,766 10,647 −161 −666 1,388 561
France 22.0 18.7 303 2,195 2,355 4,853 −96 −423 368 −151
United Kingdom 20.1 12.6 115 1,946 1,931 3,992 −128 −1,148 −347 −1,624
Italy 29.1 25.5 333 3,553 2,559 6,444 −192 −234 517 91
Spain 23.2 17.5 271 1,827 1,494 3,592 −97 185 353 440
Canada 20.8 16.0 157 1,138 1,482 2,777 −102 −136 193 −45
Australia 18.2 14.5 165 641 855 1,661 −48 3 196 150
South Korea 29.7 22.8 655 2,646 2,077 5,378 −468 −735 524 −679
Netherlands 22.8 19.0 89 643 929 1,661 −42 −87 158 29
Emerging
China 31.7 33.3 121,342 87,568 49,468 258,378 9,963 20,508 11,965 42,436
Russian 
Federation
24.7 21.9 4,259 6,749 6,228 17,237 −1,403 −2,120 2,198 −1,325
Brazil 29.6 28.7 8,347 9,490 9,823 27,660 −705 2,450 4,118 5,863
India 27.9 27.3 57,926 41,933 26,483 126,343 2,118 10,896 7,025 20,039
Mexico 30.3 24.4 2,817 6,128 3,205 12,150 −400 1,403 1,121 2,124
Table 5.7  GVC Workers in Manufactures, 1995 and 2008
up15shm
g20ch5.indd   152
up15shm
g20ch5.indd   152
2/17/2015   1:17:12 PM
2/17/2015   1:17:12 PM
   153
NOTE: GVC workers are workers directly or indirectly involved in the production of manufacturing goods. Columns 3 through 6 indicate 
the total number of GVC workers by sector in 2008; columns 7 through 10 indicate the change in the number of GVC workers by sector 
between 1995 and 2008. The last column shows the change in the total number of workers in the economy for that period. Some numbers 
in the “All sectors” columns may be off by 1 because of rounding.
SOURCE: Authors’ calculations based on World Input-Output Database, April 2012.
Turkey 27.1 30.4 1,778 3,115 1,554 6,446 −341 620 584 863
Indonesia 32.1 25.6 13,921 7,427 5,725 27,073 −1,899 −425 1,380 −944
Poland 31.0 28.8 917 2,278 1,347 4,542 −468 81 368 −19
Czech Republic 30.8 30.9 93 990 553 1,636 −59 74 35 50
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half of those jobs are found in agriculture and even more so in services—
workers who are involved in the production of intermediate goods and 
services used in the manufacturing process. These fi ndings testify to the 
increasing intertwining of manufacturing and service activities. 
Following Baumol’s cost disease hypothesis, one might argue that 
this shift in the sectoral distribution of the GVC jobs might be inter-
preted as the result of differential productivity growth in manufacturing 
and services. But while there is clear evidence that productivity growth 
in manufacturing is higher than in services overall, this does not neces-
sarily hold for the service activities in GVCs of manufactures. These 
only form a subset of the services sector, and they involve in particular 
intermediate services such as wholesaling, transportation, fi nance, and 
several business services.14 These activities are generally open for inter-
national competition and likely to have much higher rates of innovation 
and productivity growth than service activities for domestic demand, 
which are dominated by personal services, education, health, and pub-
lic administration. Hence, it seems more likely that our fi ndings are 
indicative of a fundamental shift in the type of activities carried out by 
advanced countries in the global production of manufactures—a shift 
away from blue-collar manufacturing to white-collar service activities. 
This hypothesis is confi rmed when one analyzes the skill content of 
GVC jobs, as is done in the next subsection.
In the major emerging economies, most of the jobs are still added 
in the manufacturing sector, as is to be expected. For China, India, 
Mexico, and Turkey, job increases in manufacturing outnumber those 
in the services sector. In Brazil, however, services job growth appears 
to be more important. Even more strongly, in Indonesia and Russia the 
number of jobs in the production of manufactures has declined. These 
countries actually lost jobs overall for the period 1995–2008 and seem 
to have entered a premature deindustrialization phase. 
Specialization in High-Skilled Activities in Advanced Countries
In a world with international production fragmentation, the broad 
Heckscher-Ohlin predictions will still hold: Countries will carry out 
activities for which local value-added content is relatively intensive 
amongst their abundant factors. In fact, increased opportunities for inter-
national production fragmentation may have the tendency to magnify 
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the comparative advantage of countries, as suggested by Baldwin and 
Evenett (2012). A simple example will illustrate. Assume two goods, A 
and B, which are both produced with two activities: a low-skilled (LS) 
and a high-skilled (HS) activity. Before unbundling, Goods A and B are 
bundles of production activities with different skill intensities. Assume 
that Good A is on average more skill-intensive than Good B, as the HS 
activity is more important in the production of A than of B. A relatively 
skill-abundant country would specialize in the production of A, and 
a skill-scarce country in the production of B. After unbundling, each 
nation specializes in specifi c production activities. The skill-abundant 
country will specialize in the HS activities in the production of both 
goods, and the skill-scarce country in the LS activities for those goods. 
As a result, the potential range of comparative advantages across coun-
tries in activities will be greater than in the fi nal products (see, e.g., 
Deardorff [2001]).15 
To test this prediction, we analyze the number of workers by skill 
type needed in GVCs of manufactures using Equation (5.1) in combina-
tion with a skill requirement vector. This vector is based on a character-
ization of workers in each industry and country by their observable edu-
cational attainment levels, as described in Section Three, “The World 
Input-Output Database (WIOD).” This delivers the number of low- (LS), 
medium- (MS) and high-skilled (HS) GVC workers for a particular 
year. Results are given in Table 5.8. We fi nd that during 1995–2008, in 
all advanced countries combined, the increase in high-skilled jobs was 
4.6 million. Medium-skilled jobs declined by nearly 3.8 million, and 
the drop in low-skilled jobs was even bigger—9.7 million. This pattern 
of high-skilled jobs growing faster (or declining slower) than medium- 
and low-skilled jobs can be found for most countries. But there are 
some regional differences. In the United States, employment in global 
production of manufactures dropped for all workers, in particular the 
medium-skilled. This is a well-known phenomenon that characterizes a 
broader segment of the U.S. economy and has been extensively studied 
(see, e.g., Autor [2010]). More surprising is the fi nding that the number 
of high-skilled jobs has also declined. This is in stark contrast to Japan 
and the major EU countries: There, less-skilled jobs also dwindled, but 
this was at least in part compensated for by increasing opportunities for 
high-skilled jobs. 
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CONCLUSION 
A global-value-chain perspective has profound implications for how 
one thinks of competitiveness and growth. It highlights the importance 
of global production networks and the increasing interrelation of con-
sumption, production, and income across national boundaries through 
the trade of goods and services. Enhancing competitiveness and growth 
is increasingly about capturing a larger share of global value chains—
in particular, of products for which global demand is growing (Por-
ter 1990). This rise of global value chains (GVCs) is also posing new 
challenges to analyses of international trade and measures of countries’ 
competitiveness. 
Table 5.8  Change in Number of Workers in Global Production of Final 
Manufactures by Skill Type, 1995 and 2008 (in thousands)
Country Low Medium High Total
United States −1,125 −3,286 −201 −4,612
Japan −1,834 −1,399 361 −2,871
Germany −168 115 614 561
France −768 52 566 −151
United Kingdom −1,236 −560 172 −1,624
Italy −1,201 853 439 91
Spain −507 391 556 440
Canada −118 −105 177 −45
Australia −84 141 94 150
South Korea −1,110 −335 766 −679
Netherlands −119 −54 202 29
Other 10 advanced −1,441 425 840 −176
Total 21 advanced −9,711 −3,762 4,587 −8,886
All other countries 56,214 64,370 19,393 139,977
World 46,503 60,607 23,981 131,091
NOTE: Figures represent changes in the number of workers (including both employ-
ees and self-employed) involved in global production of fi nal manufactures between 
1995 and 2008, split into the number of low-skilled, medium-skilled, and high-skilled 
workers based on educational attainment. Some numbers may be off by 1 because of 
rounding.
SOURCE: Authors’ calculations based on World Input-Output Database, April 2012.
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In this chapter, we take a macro perspective and analyze the value-
added of production for a wide set of manufacturing product groups. 
This is done through a newly developed accounting method in which 
we build upon an input-output modeling of the world economy in the 
tradition of Leontief (1949). The novelty of our approach is that we 
trace the value added by all labor and capital that is directly and indi-
rectly used for the production of fi nal manufactures. We call this “GVC 
income.” We also introduce the related concept of “GVC jobs,” which 
connotes the number of jobs directly and indirectly needed in the pro-
duction of fi nal goods. To measure GVC incomes and jobs for a wide 
set of countries in the world, we use the global input-output tables and 
supplementary labor accounts from the World Input-Output Database, 
available at www.wiod.org and described in Timmer (2012). 
The chapter presents new evidence on the main changes in GVC 
income and jobs across both mature and developing countries. Taken 
together, the results show that international fragmentation in the pro-
duction of manufactures has been accompanied by a rapid shift toward 
higher-skilled activities in advanced nations. These activities are 
increasingly carried out in the services sector and no longer in the man-
ufacturing sector itself. As such, the shift contributes to the so-called 
job polarization in advanced economies, as the displaced manufactur-
ing workers are likely to be absorbed into personal and distributional 
services, where low-skilled employment opportunities are still growing 
(Goos, Manning, and Salomons 2011). Emerging economies are taking 
up increasing shares in global GVC income; much of this increase has 
been driven by rapid growth in China after its accession to the WTO in 
2001. We also fi nd increasing intertwining of manufacturing and ser-
vices activities, which argues against a myopic view of manufacturing 
jobs in discussions on GVC issues. Rather than focusing on the particu-
lar sector in which jobs are lost or created, the discussion should be led 
by a view toward the activities that are carried out in GVCs, irrespective 
of the sector in which they are ultimately classifi ed. Thinking in terms 
of sectors is basically a relic of a world where fragmentation of produc-
tion, both domestically and internationally, had not progressed far. 
Although the model to measure GVC income and jobs is relatively 
straightforward, it is clear that the validity of the fi ndings relies heavily 
on the quality of the database used. The WIOD is a prototype database 
developed mainly to provide a proof-of-concept, and it is up to the sta-
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tistical community to bring international input-output tables into the 
realm of offi cial statistics. The development work done by the OECD 
(Ahmad, Chapter 6 of this volume) is certainly a step in the right direc-
tion. Various weak areas in data remain, particularly in the measurement 
of trade in services and intangibles. In addition, because of the lack of 
fi rm-level data matching national input-output tables, one currently has 
to rely on the assumption that all fi rms in an industry have a similar 
production structure. If various types of fi rms, in particular exporters, 
have a different production technology and input sourcing structure 
(i.e., they import larger shares), more detailed data might reveal a bias 
in the results presented here. More information on the ownership of 
capital income, which is currently measured on a domestic basis rather 
than on a national basis, is also desirable. This is far from easy, though, 
and in pursuing this line of investigation one needs to trace not only the 
nationality of the fi rms involved but also the nationality of the ultimate 
claimants of residual profi ts. 
Arguably the most important area where more study is needed is in 
tracing where in the value chain the profi ts from lead fi rms are realized, 
as well as how these are recorded in the current statistical system. For 
example, the product case studies by Dedrick, Kraemer, and Linden 
(2010), among others, suggest that the profi ts made by the lead fi rms 
in the chains can only be inferred by comparing the fi nal purchase and 
exfactory prices of the product, which include the trade margins (see 
also Gereffi  1999). The use of brand names, software, knowledge sys-
tems, and other intangibles of the lead fi rm by other fi rms in the chain 
is typically not compensated for by a direct money fl ow from the users. 
Rather, the compensation is realized indirectly through the ability of the 
lead fi rm to have the exclusive right to sell the particular product with 
a premium through its own (or through other tightly controlled) sales 
channels. This indirect compensation takes place in value chains that 
are completely within a multinational enterprise, but it also arises in 
chains that are to a large extent organized through arm’s-length trans-
actions. When the residual profi ts are realized—in other words, when 
manufacturing fi rms sell to fi nal consumers—this is picked up in our 
GVC income measure. But alternative value-chain arrangements are 
feasible.
One particular example is the existence of so-called factoryless 
goods producers (FGPs), which are proliferating in the United States. 
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These are fi rms that are manufacturer-like in that they perform many of 
the tasks and activities found in manufacturing establishments them-
selves, except for the actual manufacturing production process. In the 
current U.S. statistical system they are classifi ed in wholesaling, and 
their output is recorded as a wholesale margin rather than as manufac-
turing sales. The value-added of these fi rms should clearly be part of 
GVC incomes of manufactures but are currently not picked up, since 
GVC income is measured at basic prices, which means that trade and 
transport margins associated with fi nal consumption are not included in 
GVC incomes. This might bias downwards the total GVC income for 
the United States compared to other countries to the extent that FGP 
production is more prominent in this country than in other countries. 
The scope for this bias is not particularly large, however. Bernard and 
Fort (2013) suggest that reclassifying the FGPs to the manufacturing 
sector would increase reported U.S. manufacturing output in 2007 by 
about 5 percent in a conservative estimate and by a maximum of 17 
percent using a more liberal set of assumptions. A deeper understand-
ing of the workings of global value chains is clearly needed before our 
measurement systems will adequately refl ect all of their intricacies.
Notes
A draft version of this chapter was prepared for the conference “Measuring the Effects 
of Globalization,” held February 28–March 1, 2013, in Washington, D.C., and orga-
nized by the W.E. Upjohn Institute for Employment Research. It is a spin-off from the 
work done under the World Input-Output Database (WIOD) project, which was funded 
by the European Commission’s Directorate-General for Research and Innovation as 
part of the Seventh Framework Programme, Theme 8: Socio-Economic Sciences and 
Humanities, Grant Agreement No. 225 281. We gratefully acknowledge the helpful 
comments we received from the conference participants and in particular from Susan 
Houseman, Michael Mandel, Carol Corrado, Brad Jensen, and Robert Koopman.
1. Additional applications of the GVC income concept and analysis of fragmentation 
can be found in Timmer et al. (2014) and Los, Timmer, and de Vries (2014).
2. This identity does not hold true at the country level, as countries can have cur-
rent account imbalances driving a wedge between value-added produced and fi nal 
consumption value.
3. See Miller and Blair (2009) for an introduction to input-output analysis.
4. Throughout the paper, we analyze fi nal expenditure, including private and govern-
ment consumption, and investment.
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5. Variations of this approach are also used in the burgeoning literature on trade in 
value-added, and our approach is related to the work by Koopman, Wang, and 
Wei (2014) and in particular the work by Johnson and Noguera (2012). But rather 
than using Leontief’s insight to analyze factor content of trade fl ows, we focus on 
analyses of global value distributions.
6. Final use includes consumption by households, government and nonprofi t organi-
zations, and gross capital formation.
7. Because industries also have secondary production, a simple mapping of indus-
tries and products is not feasible.
8. When considering all goods and services produced, the GVC income of a country 
is equal to gross domestic product when fi nal demand for all goods and services 
in the world economy are taken into account. Hence, for a meaningful analysis, 
one has to limit the group of products, and we focus on those products for which 
production processes are most fragmented and which can be analyzed with the 
data at hand.
9. We do not show the value-added by the “Rest of the World,” consisting of all coun-
tries not covered individually in the world input-output database but for which an 
estimate has been made as a group (see Section Three, “The World Input-Output 
Database [WIOD]”). Its share in global GVC income rose from 14 percent in 1995 
to 17 percent in 2008.
10. The euro was introduced in 2001. For the period before 2001, we are referring to 
the Deutsche Mark.
11. Johnson and Noguera (2012) focused on foreign fi nal demand for all goods and 
services, not only on fi nal manufactures as we do here.
12. The share of the natural resource sector in Russia is severely underestimated, since 
part of the oil and gas production is classifi ed under wholesale services rather than 
under mining in the Russian national accounts. Adding the wholesale sector would 
almost double the natural resource share in 2008.
13. We will use the term “jobs” instead of “number of workers” as shorthand. But the 
underlying data pertains to number of workers rather than jobs. Ideally, one would 
like to measure hours worked.
14. It should be noted that these numbers exclude any jobs involved in the retailing 
of manufacturing goods, as we analyze fi nal demand at the basic price concept. 
15. Following this traditional international trade theory, having a greater range of 
comparative advantages across countries would generate higher welfare improve-
ments from trade. These models are essentially comparative, static of nature, and 
they disregard any dynamic effects. In the innovation and business literature, it 
has been recently argued that the separation of high-skilled, innovative activities 
in advanced countries from production in emerging economies will in the long run 
lead to a decline of innovation activity. In this literature, the spillovers from manu-
facturing and innovation activities are central (see, e.g., Pisano and Shih [2012]).
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